ISRAEL / GAZA

Implementation, civilian protection and verified transition | v0.1 | 1 October 2026

Private discussion draft by Daniel Widera, prepared with AI assistance. Editorial consistency review completed; independent expert review pending. No institutional representation, implementation authority or assurance of political feasibility.

Protection and essential assistance remain independent. Further agreed steps require competent actors, demonstrated performance and an executable next increment.

Connect to the existing arrangements

OCHA continues to report serious supply gaps [S1]. UNSCO reported on 24 September that the NCAG and ISF were not yet operational on the ground [S2]. Resolution 2803 provides an existing institutional framework [S3]. The ICRC reported completion of the earlier return operation on 29 January [S4].

This separate module supports implementation: verifiable obligations, actual delivery, local civilian readiness and incident handling. It reuses general process rules from Ukraine/Russia and USA/Iran; their territorial or nuclear milestones are not imported.

Three workstreams in parallel

- Humanitarian: protection, food, water, medical care, shelter and family clarification according to need and law. These are not political rewards.
- Security: each actor's ceasefire duties, agreed Israeli withdrawal steps and verifiable commitments by named armed groups; practical civilian safety.
- Administration and recovery: competent Palestinian civilian bodies, executable budgets, basic services and a reviewable transition with a political horizon.

Scope and rights

The draft supports protection of Palestinian and Israeli civilians. Palestinian self-determination and Israeli civilian safety are not placed on an incentive ladder. Humanitarian law and applicable binding court decisions remain independent. Final status, borders, liability proceedings and political legitimacy are not determined here.

Gaza forms part of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and links with Palestinian institutions cannot be excluded from the political and legal framework.

ANNEX A: PROGRESSION

Milestone matrix | three workstreams; no automatic clock-based progression

Stage	Proposed, actor-specific performance	Next step / limit
0 / readiness	Israeli authorities and the competent Palestinian actors confirm their own duties and contacts. Civilian operators, verifiers and donors clarify access, resources and fallback arrangements.	Agree executable action sheets. A signature or mandate alone does not prove readiness. Existing protection duties already apply.
1 / stabilisation	Israeli chains demonstrate agreed restraint and lawful humanitarian access. Named armed groups demonstrate their own ceasefire and non-obstruction duties. Operators show usable civilian delivery.	Prepare limited next security and transition increments under their own criteria. Humanitarian delivery continues independently of disputes about other performance.
2 / local transition	Verify the agreed Israeli withdrawal and precisely scoped weapons-decommissioning measures. Legitimate Palestinian civilian bodies demonstrate local safety and service readiness.	Perform the specified handover; one area or declared weapons lot does not establish complete disarmament. Disburse project funds under lawful project criteria.
3 / continuity	Monitor completed steps, implement further agreed withdrawal and lawful security measures, and strengthen services, accountability and institutional links.	Further agreed handovers; review and lawfully end temporary exceptional arrangements. A technical transition is no substitute for a political process.

The matrix creates no new veto

These stages organise additional implementation arrangements. They cannot dilute existing withdrawal, protection or access obligations. Incomplete services cannot justify indefinite delay; identify corrective action, responsibility and the next review date.

Each action sheet specifies the duty, legal basis, responsible actor, verifier, baseline, exceptions, decision rule, remedy and review route. Deadlines must be agreed; elapsed time alone proves no performance.

ANNEX B: AUTHORITY

Allocate responsibility | common verification discipline, different legal duties

Actor / function	To resolve before implementation
Israeli authorities	Responsible civilian and military chains, access and border decisions, their own protection duties and withdrawal steps. Specific occupation-law obligations require separate consideration [S5].
PA and NCAG	Palestinian Authority (PA) and National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG): distinct transitional functions, legal authority, practical liaison and local service responsibility within the existing framework [S3].
Hamas / other armed groups	Only named groups and responsible representatives can make their own verifiable commitments. Civilians are not treated as their representatives. The draft grants no legitimacy to violence or political representation through weapons possession.
BoP / ISF	Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF): applicable mandate, actual presence, command, staff, funding and oversight. This paper does not create a UN blue-helmet mission [S3].
Egypt / mediators / donors	Confirm their own border and legal powers, accepted mediation role or actually committed resources. No body automatically guarantees another actor's behaviour.
Humanitarian organisations	UN organisations, ICRC, aid agencies and local partners act only within their mandates and with their own consent. Neutral humanitarian access does not make them military adjudicators.

Palestinian participation and civilian oversight

Affected municipalities, independent civilian representatives, women and particularly vulnerable people need safe participation and complaint channels. Functional capacity is no substitute for political legitimacy. An external transition must not become permanent merely through repeated pilot extensions.

Support for a group, breach of an actor's own commitments and legal responsibility require separate analysis. No blanket attribution to a population.

ANNEX C: VERIFICATION

Verify the agreed scope | provenance, uncertainty and confidentiality

Subject	Required finding / limitation
Ceasefire / incidents	Combine independent, lawful observations with time-specific incident reports. A video or sensor alone establishes neither intent nor responsibility.
Withdrawal / local control	Independently confirm the defined scope and actual handover; record residual risk. Do not publish tactical location data.
Weapons decommissioning	Authorised specialists determine access, scope and custody for the agreed measures. One verified lot does not establish the absence of all other weapons or infrastructure.
Humanitarian delivery	Separately evidence approval, crossing, safe onward movement, handover and usable delivery at the civilian destination. Truck counts alone cannot prove needs-based coverage.
Services / funds	Check working water services, accessible medical care, accountable operators, usable budgets and complaints. Announcements and pledged totals are not delivery.

Evidence is not a majority vote

Two analyses of the same source are not independent evidence paths. Record event identifiers, time, provenance, integrity, gaps and conflicts; keep originals separate from assessments. Loss of access first creates documented uncertainty, not an automatic breach finding.

Protect verifiers and affected people

Authority, access, safety, personnel, resources and reporting rights must exist in practice. Confidential humanitarian data remain with the competent organisations; medical data, family information and beneficiary lists must not become public security registers.

AI outputs may assist analysis. They are not independent evidence of compliance, guilt or military attribution.

ANNEX D: CIVILIAN DELIVERY

Assistance and recovery | need, safety and accountability

Area	Evidence to define before implementation
Need and access	Assess need and particularly vulnerable groups; check lawful, timely access decisions and the chain through to actual use. Security screening must be lawful and proportionate.
Water / health / shelter	Named operators, resources, spare parts, medicines, maintenance and fallback arrangements. Demonstrate usable water, accessible care and genuinely suitable shelter; plan for rainy-season risks.
Finance	Distinguish a pledge, legal approval, available payment and project delivery. Agree lawful payment routes and competent auditors; banks, UN bodies or donors are not presumed already committed.
Procurement / oversight	Document responsibility, cost, civilian end-use, conflicts of interest and independent audits. Investigate the affected contract where there is a specific fraud concern; maintain civilian continuity through lawful alternatives.
Hazards / property	Qualified assessment of explosive remnants, unstable buildings and health risks. Protect records, property claims and human remains through competent procedures. This paper clears no area.
Movement / complaints	Return must be voluntary and informed, without pressure to enter unsafe areas. Medical evacuation is not permanent exclusion from return. Missing documents or political labels cannot categorically exclude people from basic assistance.

Project approval is not a political reward

Restoration of essential services also remains outside the political incentive ladder. Construction lots and payments may be staged under applicable lawful project, safety and control criteria. They are not collectively blocked because of an unrelated armed-group breach.

A specific acute safety risk may require a professionally justified operational change. Protection, safe alternatives, remedy and renewed assessment must follow. The civilian need for protection is not extinguished.

ANNEX E: LOCAL PILOT

Make an existing project executable | no competing mandate

Proposed first scope

Support a water-and-health project, selected by competent local operators, with rainy-season preparedness within existing plans. Agree concrete access, protection, delivery and operating findings. A corresponding local security transition can be added only under accepted, separate arrangements.

Start gate for additional pilot arrangements

- Identify accountable operators, competent Israeli authorities and legitimate Palestinian civilian bodies; separately specify any necessary armed-group duties.
- Document initial need, accessible and professionally suitable facilities, supply gaps and residual risks.
- Confirm budget, staff, lawful procurement, actual payment route, maintenance and a safe fallback.
- Make independent verification, evidence rules, privacy, incident handling, review and deadlock resolution operational.
- Before an additional local handover, plan authority, civilian safety and service continuity; existing legal withdrawal duties remain intact.

Keep the transition reviewable and bounded

Agree scope, responsible body, next review and an exit procedure for each additional exceptional arrangement. Coordinate civilian services with the PA, NCAG and applicable existing structures; establish no competing administration. Complaints must remain usable without digital devices or complete documentation.

An unmet pilot prerequisite must not halt existing assistance or protection duties. Timing follows need and the accepted arrangements; this paper offers no validated implementation deadlines.

Do not reactivate the completed earlier return phase [S4]. Current missing-person, detention and family cases require their own clarification, humane treatment, competent legal procedures and dignity. The ICRC is not presumed already commissioned as a verifier.

ANNEX F: INCIDENTS AND CHALLENGE

Protect, investigate and contain consequences | editorial review

Finding	Proposed response
Unknown / conflicting	Protect immediately, preserve evidence and refer to the competent investigation. No automatic blame or collective consequence.
Confirmed / limited	Identify the responsible obligation, cause and remedy. Pause only the affected next additional step where it may lawfully be suspended.
Serious / systematic	Competent independent review, immediate protection and expressly agreed lawful consequences. No automatic military retaliation.

Challenge case	Required rule
Truck crosses; clinic gets nothing	Verify delivery through to actual civilian use.
Unattributed armed-group attack	Separately examine conduct, attribution and each actor's own duty.
One weapons lot checked; access gaps	Certify only the verified scope; retain unresolved gaps.
Monitoring fails	Record uncertainty and lawful substitutes; invent no compliance finding.
Budget pledged; payment missing	Mark funds undelivered; require competent remedy and service continuity.
Incident / fraud concern at one partner	Investigate specifically; protect basic services and other operations.
Transition body refuses to decide	Use pre-agreed independent review and appeal.

Predetermine the decision-maker, evidence standard, access to findings, justified review periods and extensions. A joint body without a rule for decision refusal is not operational.

These are design challenges, not simulations or empirical validation. Editorial consistency review is no substitute for independent security, legal, humanitarian or political expert review.

SOURCES AND REVIEW

Public primary sources | checked 1 October 2026

[S1] OCHA oPt: Humanitarian Situation Report, 25 September 2026 (28.09.2026; reporting date 25.09.2026). Supply, access and funding gaps; rainy-season risks. Official source

[S2] UNSCO: Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (24.09.2026). Status of transitional bodies; authorisation is not operational readiness. Official source

[S3] UN Security Council: S/RES/2803 (2025) (17.11.2025). Existing ceasefire, transition and ISF framework; no mandate for us. Official source

[S4] ICRC: Release and transfer operations under ceasefire agreement completed (29.01.2026). That return operation is complete; verify any current individual case. Official source

[S5] ICRC: IHL on the Occupying Power's responsibilities (28.03.2023; updated 02.08.2024). Specific occupation duties; actors have different legal obligations. Official source

[S6] ICRC: Targeting civilians leads to further spirals of violence and hatred (10.10.2023). Historical statement on all parties' protection duties; not a current situation report. Official source

Four questions for the first expert review

- Which additions conflict with existing agreements, mandates or legal duties, or merely duplicate them?
- Which local functions, consents, resources and verification access are missing for a narrowly scoped pilot?
- Where could a security, access or financial rule effectively block aid, collectively harm civilians or entrench transitional administration?
- Which evidence would be manipulable, inaccessible or dangerous for affected people?

Sources establish background and published positions; they do not validate this proposal. Status findings apply to their reporting dates. Institutional participation, political agreement, present operational readiness and funding are not promised.

Version v0.1, 1 October 2026. Author: Daniel Widera, private individual. Source links are clickable. Recipients and correspondence are to be selected after content review.