USA / IRAN

De-escalation and reciprocal verification | v0.1 | 1 October 2026

Private discussion draft by Daniel Widera, prepared with AI assistance. Editorial consistency review completed; independent expert review pending. No government, party, company or institutional representation. No implementation mandate or assurance of feasibility.

Verified performance on both sides - an executable, legally approved exchange - the next agreed increment.

Purpose and limited scope

A process design for officials to criticise, adapt or reject. It structures sequencing across maritime and military restraint, nuclear verification, and executable economic measures. It does not decide an acceptable final nuclear settlement or allocate regional rights.

The Ukraine/Russia framework supplies general process principles. This is a separate conflict module; territorial withdrawal and civilian takeover are not imported as Iran-specific milestones. Israel/Gaza remains a separate workstream.

Four design commitments

- Both parties must prove delivery. A paper authorisation is not evidence that an agreed economic benefit can actually be used.
- Existing humanitarian, safeguards and other legal obligations remain independent of the incentive mechanism. No licence to breach them is created.
- Early, limited maritime arrangements can run alongside nuclear baseline work. Major economic openings require separately defined, cumulative nuclear and security findings.
- No party is assigned control over another state or armed group merely by assertion. Third-party participation and responsibility require explicit provisions.

Initial pilot

Proposed entry point: mutually specified military and maritime restraint, safe monitoring access and a limited civilian economic measure only after its agreed conditions are met. The nuclear baseline process begins in parallel; the pilot cannot certify the whole programme.

No coordinates, tactical deployments, enrichment percentages, stockpile quantities or financial amounts are prescribed here. Competent authorities and experts must negotiate and verify them.

ANNEX A: PROGRESSION

Milestone matrix | advancement follows findings, not elapsed time

Stage	Iran: proposed delivery	USA: proposed delivery
0 / readiness	Confirm responsible authorities, safe IAEA access planning, initial declarations and incident contacts.	Confirm responsible authorities, incident contacts and the legal and operational readiness of every proposed benefit.
1 / limited stabilisation	Implement the agreed military and maritime restraints; disclose relevant civilian-navigation hazards to competent channels.	Implement agreed military restraint and precisely scoped adjustments to blockade measures, subject to applicable law.
2 / baseline and first exchange	Enable IAEA verification of the defined baseline and correction of recorded gaps within an agreed access plan.	Activate a small, time-limited civilian economic measure after the specified findings; demonstrate usable delivery.
3 / cumulative progression	Demonstrate the legally compatible additional nuclear limitations, sustained monitoring and agreed security commitments.	Deliver additional, proportionate economic measures with duration and enforceability matched to the Iranian commitments.

One action sheet per exchange

- Define the obligation, scope, starting evidence, responsible signer, verifier, decision rule and permissible exceptions.
- Identify the exact economic measure, jurisdiction, authorising instrument, value, expiry, renewal rule and evidence of usable delivery.
- Specify the correction period, review route, partial-performance treatment and proportionate consequence before implementation.

Maintain agreed benefits only within their authorised term and conditions. New benefits require new verified performance.

72 hours, 7, 30 and 90 days may be negotiation parameters for reviews. They are not validated implementation deadlines, automatic activators or substitutes for safe inspection access.

ANNEX B: MARITIME SAFETY

Military restraint and civilian navigation | proposed verification functions

Define the reciprocal restraint precisely

Specify prohibited military actions, protected civilian activities, incident-notification duties and the scope of any agreed blockade adjustment. Preserve applicable law, sovereignty and existing navigation rights. Passage is not converted into a permanently purchasable concession.

Demonstrate outcomes safely

- Use competent maritime authorities, qualified hazard assessments and independent incident reports. No UN or other monitoring mandate is assumed.
- Navigation hazards, including mine or unexploded-ordnance risks, require specialist assessment and lawful clearance or exclusion decisions.
- Commercial operators retain their own safety decisions. Civilian vessels must not become compulsory experimental test objects.
- A quiet period or a single successful transit is insufficient by itself. Review sustained incidents, lawful access and unresolved safety restrictions.

Evidence independence

AIS, vessel reports, satellite observations and port records can corroborate relevant findings, but two products using the same feed are not two independent sources. Record provenance, uncertainty, gaps and possible spoofing. No sensor alone establishes intention or state responsibility.

Activation boundary

Limited maritime stabilisation is compatible with ongoing nuclear baseline work. Large or hard-to-reverse economic measures require the additional cross-track conditions written into their action sheets. Neither all-or-nothing linkage nor unlimited relief on a single maritime finding is proposed.

Independent protection

Humanitarian assistance, civilian protection and radiological emergency cooperation continue independently of disputes about economic benefits. Existing duties are not rewards to be earned.

ANNEX B: NUCLEAR VERIFICATION

Restore knowledge before certifying performance

The IAEA reported major gaps in knowledge and in-field verification in September 2026 [S1, S2]. Historical quantities are therefore not treated as verified current inventories.

Milestone	Required finding / limit
Access readiness	Competent access arrangements, inspector safety, documents and practical scheduling are in place. This is not a whole-programme compliance finding.
Baseline reconstruction	The IAEA determines which declarations, inventories, facility information and unresolved safeguards issues can be verified, and records remaining gaps.
Additional commitments	The parties and competent authorities define legally compatible additional limitations and the separate verification arrangements required for them.
Continuity	Agreed monitoring continues; missing information, equipment failure, deliberate obstruction and confirmed non-compliance are distinguished.
Cumulative finding	Only the defined scope can be certified. An inspected site or monitored declared stock does not establish the absence of all undeclared activities.

IAEA authority and confidentiality

Existing safeguards obligations are not made optional or conditional on payment. Additional tasks for a negotiated arrangement require the applicable legal basis, request, approval, funding and practical access [S2]. Our proposal cannot expand the Agency's mandate.

Provide officials with the agreed findings and limitations. Protect restricted safeguards information; do not publish detailed inventories, inspection arrangements or sensitive site data unnecessarily.

Irreversible steps

Any material reduction or other difficult-to-reverse action needs independently confirmed performance and proportionate, executable counterpart commitments. A political announcement alone is not an adequate delivery finding.

Technical procedures, thresholds and permissible activities are for nuclear specialists and competent legal authorities. This document supplies no operational nuclear instructions.

ANNEX C: ECONOMIC DELIVERY

Legal readiness, usable value and durable reciprocity

Current OFAC Iran-related licensing policy is restrictive [S3, S4]. No trade, payment, oil or asset-release window in this proposal is an existing permission. Additional political and legal decisions may be necessary.

Before activation	Evidence to agree
Legal authority	Identify every relevant restriction, decision-maker and lawful authorisation or waiver. A US decision cannot alone change EU, UN or third-state measures.
Real delivery	Confirm the licensed bank/payment route, permitted counterparties, eligible civilian uses, currency, fees and actual availability to the agreed beneficiary.
Bounded scope	Set positive lists, quantity/value limits, end-use checks, audits, exclusions and expiry. Do not create an evasion channel or military procurement route.
Duration and renewal	Match benefit duration and legal robustness to the commitment's cost and reversibility. State residual political and legal risk honestly.
Dispute and remedy	Define who determines non-delivery, correction, renewal, suspension and any legally enforceable remedy. No compensation is promised without authority and funding.

Check the USA's side as well

A formally issued licence may still leave the agreed transaction unusable. Independent evidence must show that the precise authorised benefit can be delivered. Do not demand the next irreversible Iranian step while ignoring an undelivered counterpart obligation.

Protect essential civilian support

Humanitarian obligations are outside the incentive ladder. Lawful channels for essential supplies require their own competent legal and operational arrangements and must not be represented as unrestricted access under this draft.

No automatic sanction lifting; no guarantee that banks or future governments will perform merely because a clause has been written.

ANNEX D: INCIDENTS AND REGION

Investigate, attribute carefully and contain consequences

Finding	Proposed response
Unknown / isolated	Protect people, preserve evidence, notify the agreed cell and investigate. Do not infer responsibility solely from a political allegation.
Confirmed, limited breach	Use a defined correction procedure and pause only the affected next exchange where appropriate and lawful.
Serious or systematic breach	Independent review of scope, attribution and intention; apply the expressly agreed lawful consequences. No automatic military response.
Benefit not delivered	Investigate legal, banking and operational causes on the USA's side as well; apply the same correction and review discipline.

Third parties and sovereign participation

Israel, Gulf states and other relevant actors need their own participation arrangements wherever obligations affect them. Neither the USA nor Iran can promise another actor's conduct without the necessary authority and commitments.

Define each signatory's own non-support, notification and investigative duties regarding named armed groups or other supported actors. Evidence of support, contractual non-performance and legal state responsibility are separate questions. A third-party incident does not automatically prove a signatory's breach.

Deadlock protection

Predetermine the decision body, membership, evidence standards, access to findings, correction windows, independent tie-break/review route and appeal. The design must handle a joint committee refusing to decide; naming an "independent commission" does not make it operational.

Keep conflicts distinct

Regional annexes may coordinate risk and communication, but progress in this module is not made dependent on a complete Israel/Gaza or Yemen settlement. Immediate protection duties continue across disputes.

IMPLEMENTATION AND CHALLENGE

Unresolved prerequisites | internal consistency review

Start gate

- Responsible political authorities and implementing military chains accept the precise commitments.
- Nuclear and maritime verifiers have the legal authority, access, staff, funding, protection and reporting arrangements required for their different roles.
- Every economic action sheet has a competent legal decision and a usable delivery path.
- The incident body, appeal route and third-party participation arrangements are executable.

Challenge case	Required design response
One accessible site, wider gaps	Certify only the inspected scope; retain unresolved baseline items.
Licence exists; bank refuses	Mark the promised benefit undelivered and use the agreed correction route.
Unauthorised armed-group attack	Investigate attribution and the signatory's own duties before a breach finding.
Monitoring equipment fails	Record uncertainty and use approved alternatives; failure alone is not proof of deliberate obstruction.
One vessel passes; hazards remain	Do not infer sustained maritime safety from a single event.
Material reduction; relief expires	Require the pre-agreed durability, renewal and dispute provisions; disclose residual risk.
Joint body is blocked	Use the agreed independent review route; do not assign unilateral truth authority.

These cases are design challenges, not simulations, empirical tests or evidence that the mechanism works. Independent mediation, nuclear, maritime and sanctions-law review remains outstanding.

SOURCES AND REVIEW

Public background sources | checked 1 October 2026

[S1] IAEA Director General, General Conference statement (14 September 2026). Reports major verification and material-knowledge gaps in Iran. Background for restoring an independently checked baseline. Open official source

[S2] IAEA, Iran safeguards report GOV/2026/50 (1 September 2026). Separates existing safeguards duties from additional verification for a negotiated arrangement, which requires the appropriate request and Board approval. Open official source

[S3] OFAC, Specific Licenses and Interpretive Guidance (Checked 1 October 2026). Current Iran-specific licensing policy is restrictive. Proposed benefits are not existing authorisations. Open official source

[S4] OFAC, Iran Sanctions programme (Checked 1 October 2026). Identifies distinct legal instruments and licensing measures. It does not approve this proposal. Open official source

[S5] Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mediation briefing (29 September 2026). Official account of continuing US-Iran mediation and regional security concerns; it is Qatar's stated position. Open official source

[S6] UN Media, Iran press encounter (25 September 2026). Records Iran's proposed seven-day sequence. A party proposal is not a concluded agreement. Open official source

Questions for the competent reviewers

- Which obligations and milestones would be unverifiable or legally incompatible?
- Which authority, access, funding and regional commitments are missing?
- Where could sequencing, non-delivery, uncertainty or an irreversible step make the arrangement unstable?

Sources establish background and published positions. They do not validate this framework, promise institutional participation or establish agreement by the parties. No current stockpile total or completed peace agreement is asserted.

Version v0.1, 1 October 2026. Author: Daniel Widera, private individual. The public source URLs are clickable. Questions about mandate and legal viability remain part of the requested review.